The Armistice of June 1940 raised the question of applying these rules to France, and arguments within the Air Ministry that summer reflected Britain's ambiguous attitude to Vichy. 26 Sinclair's initial memorandum on France, as accepted by the War Cabinet, was more restrictive than the statement of 31 May: the list of legitimate targets was shorter and the zone libre off limits. Though accepting that military objectives in unoccupied France 'should be destroyed', the Cabinet refused British bombardment as a means to do so, optimistically preferring the idea of Gaullist sabotage. 27 The second general statement, dated 29 October 1942, formalised what had become a radical difference in policy towards enemy and enemy-occupied territories. In relation to Germany, the directives of 9 July 1941 and 14 February 1942 identified destroying civilian morale as an essential goal: 28 the statement of 29 October 1942 argued that the enemy's resort to 'unrestricted air warfare' justified the area bombing of Germany, Italy, and Japan. For occupied territory, on the other hand, the 29 October statement reproduced much of the June/July 1940 policy. It reinforced provisions against civilian casualties, stating that 'if any doubt exists as to the possibility of accurate bombing and if a large error would involve the risk of serious damage to a populated area, no attack is to be made'. Yet daytime raids on French railway locomotives and nocturnal attacks on all French trains were authorised: only Germans and 'collaborationists', it was assumed, could travel by night. 29 The statement still applied only to Occupied France. In 1941, General Hastings Ismay, Military Secretary to the War Cabinet, had countered Portal's proposal to attack the zone libre by stating that unoccupied France was 'in certain senses a neutral country'. 30 A year later, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's recommendation of no change until Pétain was 'behaving much worse than he is at present' was still the consensus. 31 However, the Germans' move into the southern zone on 11 November led, within weeks, to raids here too. And as we shall see, operational requirements could override the general policy statements.
The Evolution of Policy, 1940-45
Thirty-two major directives issued between 4 July 1940 and 14 September 1944 -the approximate period of the Occupation -are reprinted in the Official History. Of these, 21
concern France directly. Their main objectives can be considered under nine headings (Table   1) .
32
Preventing a German invasion of the UK was a primary objective of bombing policy from
June 1940, and a secondary one into 1941. Main targets were German shipping and barges in ports from Calais to Le Havre, and Luftwaffe airfields in France. The Channel ports were heavily attacked on 7 September 1940, when invasion was considered imminent. 33 Coastal barges were easy targets and these raids succeeded. But Bomber Command could still muster only limited forces: some attacks on airfields were undertaken by single unescorted
Blenheims. 34 The French General Staff's post-war survey indicated 292 French dead in Allied raids in 1940.
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Offering operational experience to new aircrews was an explicit aim of the directive of 30
October 1940. 36 Trenchard referred to the Channel Ports as 'a bombing range', offering 'good practice for our pilots before they bombed Germany'. 37 But the presence of smaller vessels, Axis merchant shipping, and submarines, attracted continued raids on French ports.
The destruction of French factories working for Germany was a major aim in three directives of 1942, and a lesser priority (at least relatively) thereafter. In part, such attacks aimed simply to disrupt German war production in France. But they were also seen as benefiting the Allies' political standing in Europe. When Eden wrote to Sinclair, in April 1942, of the 'bracing effect on French morale' of raids on factories in France, adding that 'our allies in every occupied territory are crying out for similar raids', he reflected a consensus among Britain's military and political leaders. 43 Later that year, Sinclair viewed the Gien tank park as a second-rate target because it was preferable, for psychological reasons, 'to attack objectives near large towns'. 44 The directive of 25 May 1942 specifically sought to 'give substance to the policy of the Political Warfare Executive which aims at discouraging the nationals of enemy occupied countries from working in German-controlled factories'. 45 Discouragement was also aimed at factory owners or managers working or considering working with the Germans: some, indeed, were persuaded by the Resistance to help sabotage their own plants to avoid raids. 46 Air raids as propaganda largely disappeared from the agenda after 1942, however. Torch, El Alamein, and Stalingrad offered clearer proof of Allied credibility; and bombing could readily have a negative as well as a positive propaganda value.
The political risks were readily understood. These were not self-evidently military targets and some civilian casualties were inevitable. Attacks were planned with corresponding circumspection. When Sinclair sought approval for the night bombing of four key factories in November 1941, the War Cabinet deferred the decision for a month. 47 It did so again in December, citing 'the recent PETAIN-GOERING conversations' as a reason: 'if fuller collaboration is in fact hanging in the balance these attacks might weigh it against us.'
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Approval was given after Christmas, when the Pétain-Goering talks had proved inconclusive. 49 Then American efforts to limit Axis use of Vichy's colonial territories stalled bombing plans again. In the Foreign Office, Cavendish-Bentinck minuted the potential dangers to relations with the State Department. Raids should neither push France further towards Germany nor provoke a quarrel with Britain's new and powerful ally. 50 Ideal industrial targets were big, visible and clearly linked to Germany. They included Renault's Boulogne-Billancourt plant, Matford-Ford at Poissy, the Gnôme-Rhône aero-engine works at Gennevilliers, and the Villacoublay aircraft works. 51 Other targets, such as Citröen's Quai de Javel plant in Paris, the Schneider works at Le Creusot and Gnôme-Rhône at Le Mans, followed. Operational instructions also aimed to minimise civilian casualties: the directive of 25
May 1942 stressed good weather, clear visibility, and experienced crews. Night operations were normally restricted to military targets distant from civilian dwellings. 52 Moreover, individual raids were discussed, sometimes at length, by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Defence Committee, and the War Cabinet, and could still be put off for political reasons. 53 Finally, attacks were preceded, in principle, by warnings, and followed by propaganda leaflets, stressing that the factories concerned had worked for Germany. 54 Harris calls it 'the first attack in which the principle of concentration in time and space was effectively employed'; the brand-new Gee navigational aid, plus clear moonlight, enabled 235 aircraft to bomb accurately at low level. He added that daylight attacks in France were also possible against the weak German defences, though 'we were often able to attack by night with equal precision'. 55 But the Renault raid still killed over 370 civilians -more than in any raid hitherto on Germany. The French service of the BBC deplored the lack of adequate warning. 56 The raid did less damage than initially thought; Renault was revisited by the US Indeed, Allied bombing on French territory peaked in the three months after D-Day. 89 Conscious of the risks, Eisenhower signed a formal instruction to the bomber chiefs on 2 June stressing the need to minimise civilian casualties. 90 Three types of attack deserve particular attention. First, villages and small towns situated at cross-roads, so-called 'choke points', were bombed just before and after D-Day. Opposed by
Tedder, but demanded by the army commanders and agreed by Leigh-Mallory, these raids did little to slow German reinforcements. 91 They also wrecked towns such as Lisieux, Vire, or Évrecy, with high civilian casualties. 92 Secondly, six major Allied ground attacks in Normandy used heavy bomber support. At Saint-Lô, bombing materially assisted the American break-out, though at the price of some casualties among US soldiers. 93 By contrast, the bombing of Caen and its suburbs in operations Charnwood and Goodwood, on 7-9 and 18-21 July, killed some 2,000 of Caen's residents and actually hindered the British advance by destroying and cratering large urban areas. 94 Thirdly, heavy bombers attacked German 'fortresses' (Festungen) established in ports, to prevent long sieges and delays to the Allied advance. Their effectiveness in this role was mostly limited. 95 Bomber Command's September raids on Le Havre, for example, wrecked most of the city centre, killed over 1,500 civilians, but made little impactless than the concurrent artillery bombardment -on German ground defences or coastal batteries. 96 The battle for France also saw sustained and effective ground support by the tactical air forces. The three types of attack above are highlighted, however, partly because they illustrate 102 The strictly political objections to unrestricted bombing had disappeared. Nor were the concerns of the Free
French expressed forcefully enough to have any significant effect on the policy.
Dealing with the French
The only available French responses to their ordeal were verbal. Complaints reached London from both Vichy and the Free French. This section compares the treatment of complaints from the two sources.
Vichy responded to air raids both via anti-Allied propaganda and through protests, addressed through a variety of channels. Equally, British reactions to Vichy included positive welcome, concern, indifference, irritation, riposte, and (very occasionally) concessions. Sinclair, however, reminded him that agreed Pointblank targets, overriding earlier restrictions, included Luftwaffe and aircraft industry centres in occupied territories. 120 Meanwhile, Sinclair's secretary, the young Reginald Maudling, produced a detailed, upbeat, survey of recent American raids on occupied territories in order to 'repel any further attacks'. 121 Eden backed down; his support for a restrictive policy, inspired by Massigli, came second to military necessity defined by the Combined Chiefs.
A letter that October to Eisenhower from General Giraud, still officially the military head of the CFLN, had no more practical effect than Massigli. Giraud wrote that the French people applauded Allied destruction of industrial plants on French soil, and praised the air crews' bravery, but warned that 'on French territory some [raids] cost more than the results they yield are worth', in terms of damage to lives and property. 122 
